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NOTES
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Protective Jurisdiction and
Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring
Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions
"Consumer protection" has come of age. The heightened appreciation of the consumer's plight has not been matched, however, by
an equal commi~ment to providing effective programs for vindicating
his cause.1 As a practical matter the consumer may be unable to assert
his rights. Suits to enforce consumer rights are costly and are not likely
to be brought when each individual claim is counted only in the
tens of dollars. 2
It was in response to this obstacle to effective enforcement of
consumer rights that Senator Joseph Tydings introduced the Class
Action Jurisdiction Act (S. 1980) in the Senate on April 25, 1969.3
The aim of this legislation was to make a class action available to
consumer-plaintiffs so that they might share the costs of litigation.
Significantly, the bill provided that the forum for this class action
was to be the federal court system,4 where the liberal requirements of
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply. 5
l. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Efjective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966), for a survey of the impediments
to a consumer's assertion of his rights. See also Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures
and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. R.Ev. 559 (1968), and
Tydings, The Private Bar-Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE DAME
I.Aw. 478 (1970).
2. See Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) (statement of Hon. Bob Eckhardt).
3. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. R.Ec. 10,460-61 (1969).
4. As used in this Note, the term "federal courts" will refer only to those courts
esablished pursuant to and under U.S. CoNsT. art. III. ''Legislative" courts established
under U.S. CONST. art. I powers present special problems that will not be considered
in this Note.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 provides in part:
{a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
{b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
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Indeed, it would seem that the grant of federal jurisdiction was
solely intended as a means to the real end of the bill-to provide
access to the federal class-action rule. 6 More important, under the
proposed legislation federal jurisdiction could be invoked even
though the action itself arose under state substantive law and there
was no diversity of citizenship between the litigants. The pertinent
section of the bill read:

(b) The district court shall have original jurisdiction, regardless
of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, of
civil class actions brought by one or more consumers or potential
consumers of goods, services, realty, or intangibles on behalf of themselves and all other consumers similarly situated, where(!) the action involves the violation of consumers' rights under
State or Federal statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers ...•7
Thus, federal jurisdiction would result whenever a state-or federal
-consumer claim was asserted.
To justify this apparent expansion of the jurisdiction of article
III courts beyond diversity and federal-question cases,8 Senator
Tydings maintained that Congress might give federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate state law claims "which arise in areas subject to
congressional regulation.'' 9 Presumably the Senator was referring to
the theory of "protective jurisdiction,"10 although his rationale was
never clearly articulated as such.11
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
6. Senator Tydings himself admitted that the bill was "designed to counterbalance
restrictive State attitudes toward consumer class actions ••.•" ll5 CoNG. REc. 10,460
(1969). He continued: "Federal court jurisdiction makes available the refinements of
contemporary Federal court practice, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the
most modern class action procedure in the United States." Id.
7. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(l) (1969), reprinted in ll5 CONG. REc. 10,460-61
(1969).
8. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
9. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969).
10. For an explanation of protective jurisdiction, see notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text.
11. This presumption grows stronger in light of the authority that Senator Tydings
cited, which included Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 157, 184-96 (1953), the classic statement of the protective-jurisdiction
theory. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969).
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This lack of clarity regarding the theoretical basis of S. 1980 has
in part been obviated by the introduction of a new bill by Senator
Tydings on October 29, 1969-the Consumer Class Action Act (S.
3092).12 The approach for conferring federal jurisdiction in the new
bill differs markedly from that of the original bill. The protectivejurisdiction rationale has been replaced by a forthright adoption of
state consumer laws as federal law.13 But to all appearances the ultimate goal of S. 3092 remains the same as that of S. 1980: to provide
consumer-plaintiffs access to the federal class-action rule.14 The
language of the new bill can be explained as an attempt to avoid any
constitutional problems that protective jurisdiction might present
by shrouding the entire exercise in the cloak of adoption.15 If, as has
been suggested, the adoption technique is being employed to achieve
the same end that the protective-jurisdiction theory was intended to
accomplish in the earlier bill, at least two questions are suggested.
Would the earlier bill itself have been constitutionally valid? If not,
can adoption be used to reach an end that could not constitution12. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 32,141-42 (1969). This
new bill was prompted by the suggestion of Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the
President for Consumer Affairs, that a class action be made available to consumers to
seek damages for unfair or deceptive practices as defined under § 5(a)(l) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). 115 CONG, REc. 32,142
(1969). (remarks of Senator Tydings). As a result, the first section of the bill addresses
itself to providing this class action under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
second part of the proposed Act, however, is concerned exclusively with federal classaction jurisdiction for suits arising under state consumer law; in this regard it parallels
the earlier Tydings bill.
13. The relevant sections of the new bill provide:
SEc. 4. (a)(l) An act in defraud of consumers which affects commerce is unlawful and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction
without regard to the amount in controversy to entertain civil class actions for
redress of such unlawful acts.
(2) For the purposes of this section an "act in defraud of consumers" is(B) an act that gives rise to a civil action by a consumer or consumers
under State statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers.

(c) In the case of any class action brought upon the basis of a violation of
consumers' rights under any State law the court shall, in deciding such action,
apply the following criteria:
(1) State law relating to the consumers' rights under State statutory or
decisional law is adopted as Federal law.
(2) Federal law applicable to each case shall be fashioned upon the law of
the State and the State statutory and decisional construction shall be applied as
if jurisdiction of the Federal court were based on diversity of citizenship.
S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969), reprinted in 115 CoNG. REc. 32,142 (1969). Section 4(a) incorporates state consumer laws in the definition of "an act in defraud of
consumers" and thus in the definition of the federal cause of action. Section 4(c)(l)
provides that in such causes of action the state law is adopted as federal law.
14. See 115 CoNG. REc. 32,142 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
15. See Letter to the Hon. Robert C. Eckhardt from Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr.,
May 27, 1969, reprinted in Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970). For a discussion of the
theory of adoption, see notes 127-31 infra and accompanying text.
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ally be reached by use of a theory of protective jurisdiction? The constitutionality of S. 3092 depends upon answers to these questions. 16
The traditional view of federal-court jurisdiction maintains that
inferior federal courts can exercise jurisdiction only when it is conferred by Congress and that congressional power to confer jurisdiction is, in turn, limited by the restrictions of article III of the
Constitution.17 Thus, article III has been viewed as the exclusive
source of judicial power and hence the power of the federal courts.18
This traditional view, however, has been questioned on occasion.
Perhaps the most notable discussion of article III limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction came in National Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company. 19 In that case, Justice Jackson,
joined by Justices Black and Burton, argued that Congress might
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts when it thought that
such an expansion was necessary and proper in order to implement
Congress' article I power over the District of Columbia.20 However,
16. S. 3092 and the companion bill introduced in the House (H.R. 14585, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969)) are in the Commerce Committees of the respective bodies. The
Administration has also introduced a bill in both Houses to provide a class action for
consumers under the Federal Trade Commission Act. S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For a discussion of the progress of these bills in
the committees, see Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NoTRE DAME LAW. 663 (1970).
17. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
The history of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution demonstrates that
there was strong sentiment at that time to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts as
much as possible. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
628-38 (1949) (Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting). Responding to this concern, Alexander
Hamilton '\\Tote: "The amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of
the judicial department is this: that it has been carefully restricted to those causes
which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national judicature •.. .'' THE
F.rnERAusr No. 81, at 353 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (Hamilton).
18. See the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge and the dissenting opinions of
Chief Justice Vinson and of Justice Frankfurter in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604, 626, 646 (1949).
19. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Tidewater arose as a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Act of April 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1964),
which granted to the federal district courts original jurisdiction over suits "between
citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Columbia •.••" The Supreme
Court had long before held in Hepburn &: Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445
(1805), that a citizen of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of a state within the
meaning of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 11, I Stat. 73, 78). Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Burton and Black,
declined to overturn this interpretation of article III. Nonetheless, they were able to
uphold the statute as "a reasonable exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to
legislate for the District of Columbia and for the Territories ••• ," under U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 337 U.S. at 588-89.
20. 377 U.S. at 588-600. Professor Mishkin characterized this approach in the
following way:
[The federal-question clause] would not then be the exclusive source of judicial
power for the national courts; rather it would be merely a reference over to the
legislative authority granted Congress by Article I of the Constitution. On this
theory, it is the total legislative power, and not Article III, which provides the
source-and thus the measure-of federal question jurisdiction.
Mishkin, supra note 11, at 190.

714

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69

six members of the Court expressly rejected Justice Jackson's argument and reaffirmed the traditional view that article III expresses
the full measure of federal judicial power.21
While re-emphasizing the role of article III as a limitation on
federal judicial power, the Tidewater decision, because of the wide
divergence among the Justices on the theories of federal-court jurisdiction, did little to resolve the difficulties implicit in an attempt to
define the scope of article III itself. Indeed, the effect of the decision
may have been to compound the difficulties, for now it is necessary
to subsume the apparent aberration of the bankruptcy cases22 under
article III alone. In those cases, the Court upheld section 23 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 23 which permits trustees in bankruptcy to bring
certain state-created causes of action in federal courts irrespective of
diversity of citizenship. Justice Jackson read the bankruptcy cases as
authority for his article I proposition in Tidewater, 24 while two of
the Justices who disagreed with that proposition attempted to justify
the bankruptcy jurisdiction in terms of article III considerations.25
Perhaps to explain the aberrational nature of the bankruptcy
cases or perhaps simply to lend some flexibility to the otherwise rigid
confines of article III, several writers have developed the thesis of
protective jurisdiction.26 Characterized by one commentator as "a
more subtle theory" to reach the same result that Justice Jackson
argued for in Tidewater,27 protective jurisdiction would permit the
expansion of federal-court jurisdiction while still purporting to
observe the dictates of article III. More precisely, under the theory
Congress could grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over matters
in which there is a federal interest to be protected.28
The several variants of the protective-jurisdiction theory, although differing slightly, all attempt to justify protective jurisdiction
21. Justices Rutledge and Murphy, although concurring in the Court's judgment,
expressly rejected Justice Jackson's argument. 337 U.S. at 607-17. Chief Justice Vinson,
joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, in dissent,
also flatly rejected the Jackson argument. 337 U.S. at 628-45, 646-52.
22. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 42-47 infra and accompanying text.
23. 11 u.s.c. § 46 (1964).
24. 337 U.S. at 594-600. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
25. 337 U.S. at 611-15 ijustice Rutledge, concurring), 652 ijustice Frankfurter,
dissenting).
26. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184-96; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 224-25 (1948).
27. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS§ 20, at 66 (2d ed. 1970).
28. Thus, for example, in the Tidewater case protective jurisdiction would f~nction
to legitimate the federal-court jurisdiction because there is a federal interest in the
affairs of the citizens of the District of Columbia, as evidenced by the article I power
to legislate for the District. The proponents of the several variants of the protectivejurisdiction theory differ in their determinations of what the federal interests are that
can be protected by federal jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 55-66 infra.
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in terms of federal-question jurisdiction. One variant suggests that
the statute granting the protective jurisdiction is itself the law of the
United States under which the case arises.29 Another variant maintains that the power to make the jurisdictional grant derives from and
arises under the federal laws previously enacted in the same general
area.30 Both variants of the theory involve a considerable expansion
of the traditional meaning of the article III words, "arising under ...
the Laws of the United States."31 Most frequently, when courts have
addressed themselves to the meaning of these words, they have in
fact been interpreting the nearly identical statutory language that
confers original jurisdiction upon the federal district courts.32 It has
been recognized that the statutory meaning of the words "arising
under" is perhaps not as broad as the constitutional meaning of these
same words. 33 Therefore, the fact that the protective-jurisdiction
theories would expand the traditional meaning of "arising under"
does not necessarily militate against the constitutionality of the
theories. But it must still be demonstrated that the definition of
"arising under" proposed in the protective-jurisdiction theories falls
within the constitutional-as opposed to the stricter statutorymeaning of that phrase.
Proponents of protective jurisdiction argue that the power of
Congress to protect federal interests justifies an expanded definition
of the term "arising under."34 There is in fact some case authority,
29. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 225.
30. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192·96.
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a survey of the traditional interpretations of
"arising under," see Gully v. First Natl. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964). See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 613-15 (1949) CTustice Rutledge, concurring).
33. The statutory language has not usually been given'as liberal a construction by
the courts and commentators as the constitutional grant. See Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900); Mishkin, supra note 11, at 160-63. Cf. Forrester, The
Nature of a "Federal Question", 16 TuL. L. R.Ev. 362 (1942).
34. As an analogue to this congressional power to protect federal interests, one
commentator has pointed to the diversity jurisdiction provided in article III itself and
to other classes of litigants that have been given access to federal jurisdiction by article
III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Mishkin, supra note 11, at 185. These clauses of article
III appear to legitimate the use of federal-court jurisdiction for protective purposes.
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 49, 82-83 (1923), which maintained that the "chief and only real reason" for
diversity jurisdiction was to protect litigants from state court prejudices. Compare that
view with Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. R.Ev. 483,
495.97 (1928), which suggested that a more important reason for establishing diversity
jurisdiction was to protect creditors from state legislatures that favored debtors. Under
either view, the framers intended federal jurisdiction to protect classes of litigants
from state prejudices.
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957),
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, questioned whether these clauses exhausted the framers'
intent on the protective use of the federal courts. If they did, application of the protective principle to the federal-question clause of article III would be precluded. There is
no logical reason why this should be so, however. It could be persuasively argued that
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equivocal though it may be, for the proposition that the Constitution
recognizes the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to protect federal
interests. The proponents of this proposition rely heavily on the
early case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,85 the only case in
which the Supreme Court has explicitly construed the scope of the
constitutional phrase "arising under." The Osborn decision cut a
wide swath for that provision. The case arose in the context of a suit
by the Bank of the United States to enjoin the collection of a state
tax levied upon it. At issue, at least as Chief Justice Marshall viewed
the case, was the constitutionality of the act that incorporated the
Bank and gave it the right to sue or be sued in every circuit court of
the United States.86 As the companion case to Osborn indicated,87
this right to sue in the federal courts would obtain even though the
particular cause of action was created by state law and only state law
would govern the outcome. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall upheld federal jurisdiction as falling within the federal-question clause
of article III since questions concerning the validity of the incorporation, the ability of the Bank to sue in contract, and the like, would
necessarily arise in any state law cause of action.88 The Chief Justice
thus deemed the federal incorporation act an "original ingredient" of
any case to whic;h the Bank was a party, and he concluded that any
such case would therefore arise under that act.39
Although Chief Justice Marshall explained the result in Osborn
solely in terms of constitutional exegesis, the concern of the Court
went beyond mere fidelity to the text of the Constitution. Justice
Johnson, in his dissenting opinion in Osborn, made explicit the concern that may have compelled the Court to its decision: state animosity toward the Bank rendered "all the protection necessary, that the
general government can give to this Bank."40 In light of this situation,
the Osborn decision might be interpreted as an attempt to protect
the form of protection codified in the diversity clause, i.e., protection of a class of
litigants from foreign and presumably unfriendly forums, represents but one branch of
a genus-protective jurisdiction-the other branch being protection of federal interests
to be implied under the federal-question clause. Under this analysis, the codification of
one branch in explicit clauses of article III would only preclude the expansion of that
same branch; it need not prevent the recognition of the other branch that is not
explicitly codified. Logically, then, the recognition of protective jurisdiction under the
diversity clause of article III would not seem to militate either for or against the application of protective jurisdiction under the federal-question clause.
35. 22 U.S. (9 "Wheat.) 738 (1824).
36. Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 269.
37. In Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824),
the Bank of the United States sued in federal court under state law to recover on
negotiable notes made by a state bank.
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823-24.
39. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824.
40. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871-72.
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the Bank in all its legal relations-particularly those governed by
state law in which federal appellate review could not redress subtle
discriminations. 41 Thus construed, the Osborn decision would be an
endorsement of the concept of protective jurisdiction.
The proponents of protective jurisdiction also cite the Bankruptcy
Act and, more specifically, its provisions for trustee suits (section 23) 42
as further authority for the proposition that the federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction in order to protect federal interests. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of section 23,43 which
sets forth instances when a trustee may invoke federal jurisdiction to
adjudicate a private cause of action based on state law. 44 Although
there is some language in these cases stating that Congress could
confer such jurisdiction by virtue of its article I power over bankruptcy,45 these decisions might better be explained in terms of the
explicit Osborn rationale: the federal bankruptcy laws are original
ingredients that would exist and could be questioned in any trustee
suit. 46 Nevertheless, it can be extrapolated from these bankruptcy
cases that one function of the federal courts is to protect at least one
type of federal interest even in state law cases. 47
At least one court, in Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 48 has found
sufficient authority in this meager precedent to sustain protective
jurisdiction. Yet even if one assumes that the Osborn decision and
the bankruptcy cases provide some constitutional basis for the
exercise of protective jurisdiction, the scope of this jurisdiction remains unclear. Failure to delineate the interests susceptible of pro41. Mishkin, supra note II at 187.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1964), provides:
(a) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies
at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this title, between
receivers and trustees as such and adverse claimants, concerning the property acquired or claimed by the receivers or trustees, in the same manner and to the
same extent as though such proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.
(b) Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in
the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under this title had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided in sections 96, 107 and 110 of this title.
43. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. See Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), in which the Court stated
that "[t]he Congress, by virtue of its constitutional authority over bankruptcies, could
confer or withhold jurisdiction to entertain such suits and prescribe the conditions
upon which the federal courts should have jurisdiction."
46. For an analysis of the bankruptcy cases in terms of federal-question jurisdiction,
see Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in the Tidewater case, 337 U.S. at 611-15.
47. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195.
48. 230 F.2d 576, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1956). See also the concurring opinion of Justice
Burton in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 459-60
(1957).
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tection renders the bounds of protective jurisdiction vague. As
discussed below,49 it may well be that the validity of the exercise of
such jurisdiction will depend upon its breadth. The several proponents of protective jurisdiction have defined the scope of the
jurisdiction differently. Not all of the proposals are equally persuasive
in constitutional terms. 50 In the one decision that has upheld the
concept of protective jurisdiction, the court itself noted the ambiguities that exist concerning the parameters of protective jurisdiction,
but did not feel compelled to define these limits since, in its judgment,
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act51-the statute under consideration-clearly fell within the constitutional bounds of protective
jurisdiction.52 Accordingly, the court failed to articulate a test for the
constitutional bounds of protective jurisdiction.53 The applicability
of an argument based on protective jurisdiction to the Taft-Hartley
Act has, of course, been subsequently rendered moot, since the Act
has been construed by the Supreme Court as a mandate to the federal
courts to develop a corpus of federal common law to govern section
301 actions. 54 Thus, there appears to be no authoritative judicial
guidance with respect to the precise constitutional limits of protective
jurisdiction. Therefore, an essentially independent determination
of the constitutionality of protective jurisdiction must be made. In
order to accomplish this, the bounds of each of the proposals will be
scrutinized to determine whether any or all fall within the constitutional limits of article III.
The proposal that sets the broadest bounds suggests that protective jurisdiction extends to any case that involves facts about which
the Congress might legislate under the Constitution. Under this
thesis, Congress could provide for federal jurisdiction over the state
law claims of a trustee in bankruptcy simply because Congress has a
general legislative power over bankruptcy. Professor Mishkin, in
describing this theory, has stated, "[S]o long as the interest is of the
49. See notes 67-75 infra and accompanying text.
50. See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
51. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
52. Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1956).
53. The court in Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead did note that the subject matter
of § 301 was one over which Congress had undisputed power and, moreover, that
Congress had actually exercised its regulatory power in the form of legislative enactments that prescribed certain rules to be applied in § 301 cases. 230 F.2d at 581. Presumably the latter fact was more persuasive to the court since the opinion in Mead
placed particular emphasis on the possibility that a federal court would be called
upon to apply federal substantive rules in deciding a § 301 case. 230 F.2d at 581-82.
The potential involvement of federal law appears to be the touchstone of the court's
judgment that the protective jurisdiction of § 301 was a constitutional exercise of
jurisdiction.
54. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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kind described, it is of no concern whether the particular case be one
as to which Congress might have enacted the substantive rule." 55
Congress has a general interest in the field of bankruptcy; a provision
for federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases is one way of protecting
this interest.
The approach to protective jurisdiction outlined above should be
distinguished from the approach that suggests that congressional
power to confer jurisdiction extends only to the particular cases over
which Congress has legislative power to make dispositive rules. 56
Professor Herbert Wechsler formulated the classic statement of this
position. 57 'While his analysis does not speak explicitly in terms of a
"federal interest" to be protected, his theory would, in effect, operate
to protect the federal interest in overseeing these types of cases. Endorsing Chief Justice Marshall's position in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States that the federal judicial power must extend to every
case that might involve an issue under federal law or the Constitution, 58 '\Vechsler's analysis goes further:
It [judicial power] should extend, I think, beyond this to all cases
in which Congress has authority to make the rule to govern disposition of the controversy but is content instead to let the states
provide the rule so long as jurisdiction to enforce it has been vested
in a federal court.1>0
In cases in which Congress could prescribe the substantive law for
the case, Congress should, according to the Wechsler thesis, have the
option of a lower-level involvement, i.e., retaining jurisdiction over
the case while permitting the states to frame the applicable law.
Other commentators have supported this underlying policy of avoiding full displacement of state law. 60
The Wechsler thesis is not without its problems, however. It has
been pointed out that the Osborn decision and the bankruptcy cases,
55. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 188. Professor Mishkin describes this as one possible
approach, but does not cite any authorities who have forwarded such a proposition. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 20, at 66 n.2, suggests that Professor Wechsler's theory allows
protective jurisdiction "wherever Congress has substantive legislative power." The
subsequent development of Wechsler's thesis appears to justify this characterization.
Sec text accompanying note 63 infra.
56. J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 138 (1949) appears to support
this position, stating that "if Congress can validly legislate concerning a matter it may
constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts of any claim arising within
the ambit of that legislative power."
57. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224-25.
58. Sec text accompanying notes 35.39 supra.
59. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224.
60. See Bickel &: Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. I, 19-21 (1957). These authors state that "(i]t would
be regrettable for Congress to be forced instead to exert its authority to the full in
order to be able to employ it at all." Id. at 20-21.
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if they do indeed lend support to the idea of protective jurisdiction,
would presumably extend federal-court jurisdiction to cases beyond
the actual legislative competence of Congress. 61 For example, it is
doubtful that Congress could have prescribed rules for every case in
which suit was brought by or against the Bank of the United States.
These cases, therefore, suggest a wider scope for protective jurisdiction than originally envisaged by Professor Wechsler.
Perhaps to answer this criticism, Professor Wechsler broadened
his original thesis of protective jurisdiction. In discussing the Tidewater case,62 Professors Wechsler and Hart appear to maintain that
even if it is assumed that Congress has no power to enact substantive
law governing the relations between residents of the District of
Columbia and residents of the other states, Congress still might confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts to protect the District's citizens
from the possibility of discrimination in state forums. 63 The Wechsler thesis in this expanded form approaches more nearly the strain
of protective jurisdiction that is the basis of the diversity clausesnamely, the protection of a class of litigants from discrimination in
foreign state courts. The thesis might be distinguished from Justice
Jackson's opinion in Tidewater only in the sense that the protection
of the class of litigants there-District residents-comes in the
context of an explicit article I power to legislate for the District. Yet,
this distinction is of no consequence because Tidewater itself
indicates that article I cannot be used to expand article III jurisdiction. 64
The difficulty with assuming that it is simply such a class of litigants that the grant of protective jurisdiction is to shelter is that this
branch of protective jurisdiction may well have been exhausted in
the diversity clauses of article III. 65 Although the Hart and Wechsler
thesis explains the assertion of protective jurisdiction in the Tidewater case on the basis of a class of litigants to be protected, that
thesis probably should not be read so narrowly. It is the existence of
a federal interest that gives Congress a special expertise in the area,
and not simply the presence of a class of litigants, that provides the
basis for the Hart and Wechsler approach to protective jurisdiction.66
Since protection of a class of litigants is not the touchstone on which
Hart and 1,Vechsler base their theory of protective jurisdiction, an
objection to the use of the Tidewater case as an example of such
61. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 189.
62. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
63. H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
(1953).
64. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 34 supra.
66. See H. HART 8: H. WECHSLER, supra note 63, at 745.
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jurisdiction is an objection only to one application of the thesis and
not to its basic rationale.
The exercise of protective jurisdiction, whether over a general
area of congressional competence, over particular cases within the
congressional lawmaking ambit, or over classes of litigants, will still
require a relation back to the federal-question clause of article III.
That is to say, the case over which protective jurisdiction is to be
exercised must in some sense "arise under" the Constitution or the
laws of the United States. It can be argued that the statute that grants
the protective jurisdiction is itself the law under which the case
arises. 67 The circularity of this suggestion is made more palatable by
the reminder that the "arising under" clause would not be eliminated
as a control upon federal jurisdiction. 68 The jurisdictional statute
would satisfy the "arising under" requirement only when it proceeded
from one of the enumerated heads of legislative power in article I of
the Constitution. However, this argument is similar to that proffered
by Justice Jackson in the Tidewater decision. 69 It is the functional,
if not the semantic, equivalent of Justice Jackson's article I rationale-a rationale that failed to sway a majority of the Court. 70 The
above approach to protective jurisdiction must, then, be viewed as
constitutionally suspect.
At least one theory of protective jurisdiction has been suggested
that would relate the federal interest to be protected more satisfactorily to the federal-question clause. Professor Mishkin has developed
a theory that posits congressional legislative programs in a particular
area as the interests that may be protected under the rubric of protective jurisdiction.71 Not every article I area would be appropriate
for protective jurisdiction; the only appropriate areas would be those
in which Congress already had an "articulated and active federal
policy" 72 as evidenced by statutory enactments. Under this theory, it
is the federal policy as reflected in the legislative program rather than
67. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224. See also Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d
576, 581 (1st Cir. 1956).
68. Bickel&: Wellington, supra note 60, at 21.
69. See notes 19·20 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Justice Jackson's opinion differs from
this analysis only in that he demonstrated less compunction to justify the results in
terms of federal-question jurisdiction. He went directly to article I for his justification.
See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 596-99 (1949).
71. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192-96. While the Mishkin article is the best known
exposition of this approach, Professor Forrester dealt with a similar suggestion several
years earlier. See Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13
LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 114, 129-30 (1948), in which Forrester analyzed the Taft-Hartley
Act in terms of a federal legislative program as an entity to be protected in much the
same way as the Bank of the United States was to be protected in the Osborn case. See
text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
72. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192.
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the immediate litigants that protective jurisdiction is meant to
protect.73 By defining the protectible interests in terms of existing
legislative programs, Mishkin's thesis attempts to justify the protection given as "arising under" the laws of the United States-those laws
being the previously enacted legislative programs. This approach to
protective jurisdiction has the added advantage of permitting these
jurisdictional grants only when there is in fact some concrete interest
to be protected. This can be contrasted with the Wechsler theory that
would allow Congress to confer jurisdiction over any area or case
simply because it falls within an article I power-a less concrete
interest unless one asumes that the real object of the protection in
such a case is the litigant and not the unexercised legislative power.74
Thus, of all the variants of protective jurisdiction, the Mishkin
thesis appears to come closest to satisfying the words and the intent of
the Constitution.75 This is not to say that the approach does not have
its faults. One major question that remains unresolved within the
Mishkin thesis is whether the justification for the exercise of protective jurisdiction is to be found in the fact that aspects of the federal
legislative program may become involved in a state law action. I£
this is the justification, proponents of Mishkin's theory would argue
that the federal courts should have jurisdiction to guarantee that the
federal law is faithfully and consistently construed.76
This appears to be the argument that Judge Magruder made in
the Mead decision, although his emphasis was somewhat differently
placed.77 Judge Magruder viewed actions under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act as suits in which "to an important extent" the courts
would be obliged to apply federal rules in determining the controversy.78 He added that Congress might then leave the rules in
residual areas to be "ascertained and applied in accordance with
state law." 79 The involvement of federal law need not be as great as
it would have been in the Taft-Hartley cases as envisioned by Judge
Magruder. Even in a suit governed on the whole by state law, the
possible involvement of some federal law might be a sufficient
ground on which to exercise federal protective jurisdiction.
73. Id. at 195-96.
74. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
75. See Forrester, supra note 71, at 118-20, 129-30.
76. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), in which the
Supreme Court held that the grounds for federal-question jurisdiction must appear on
the face of the plaintiff's complaint, should not preclude this exercise of jurisdiction
since the Mottley requirement is statutory rather than constitutional. See notes 32-33
supra and accompanying text. The Osborn decision defines the parameters of the constitutional words, "arising under ••• the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. Ill, § 2. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
77. Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d 576, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1956).
78. 230 F.2d at 581.
79. 230 F.2d at 581·82.

March 1971]

Notes

723

This regard for the interstitial aspects of federal law in state law
cases is not a new one. Indeed, viewed in these terms, protective
jurisdiction is simply a restatement of Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation in Osborn of the federal-question clause: a question of
the Bank's validity and powers would arise in every case to which the
Bank was a party-hence federal jurisdiction should attach.80 The
Mishkin thesis thus construed would differ from Chief Justice Marshall's rationale only in that the former would not require that the
possibly interstitial federal law be an original ingredient of the case
as well. In the Osborn case, the existence of the Bank depended upon
federal law which became, in a sense, the but-for cause of the state
cause of action. The exercise of protective jurisdiction, on the other
hand, would be based only on the interstitial aspects of federal law in
the area.
The Mishkin theory can be interpreted in another way, however.
Under this second reading, it is not the interstitial possibilities that
prompt federal jurisdiction; rather, the important consideration is
simply a desire to utilize the federal courts for the adjudication of
cases that fall within areas in which Congress has expressed some
legislative policy. The test for protective jurisdiction would still be
the existence of a legislative program and policy in the field. Under
this second interpretation of the Mishkin thesis, however, it would
not be necessary to demonstrate that the federal laws expressing that
policy or program would become implicated in the state law case. The
purpose of protective jurisdiction under this interpretation is not to
protect the federal laws as such, but to guarantee that the case is
heard in the forum that is most sympathetic to the general concerns
and broad contours behind the federal policy. 81 This approach obviously runs counter to the traditional notion of protective jurisdiction embodied in the diversity clause. That notion is one of protection for litigants from a hostile forum in a foreign state-not one of
protection for litigants from their own state courts. 82 This distinction
creates no problem, however, if it is assumed, as was suggested
80. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
81. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195, states:
Even in cases where no specific statutory provision is itself involved, the overall
federal policy thus may nonetheless be better protected if all connected litigation
is adjudicated by courts well versed in, and receptive to, the national policies established by the legislation.
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 476 (1956), construed the Mishkin thesis as not based upon
the interstitial formula. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter commented:
Professor Mishkin's theory of "protective jurisdiction" may find more constitutional
justification if there is not merely an "articulated and active" congressional policy
regulating the labor field, but also federal rights existing in the interstices of actions
under § 301 [of the Taft-Hartley Act].
353 U.S. at 476-77.
82. See note 34 supra.
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earlier,83 that there are two forms of protective jurisdiction: protection for certain classes of litigants, as is the case in diversity jurisdiction; and protection for the federal interest in legislative programs,
as may be implied in the federal-question clause. While the applicability of the first form might be limited to cases in which litigants
appear before foreign forums, the protection of a federal policy would
seem necessary even when a litigant is before his own forum. 84
The most important question about the Mishkin theory that
remains unresolved is whether the theory will prove persuasive
enough to convince the Supreme Court of its constitutionality. As
indicated above, 85 when construed as an interstitial theory, the Mishkin thesis comes very close to the theory on which the Osborn case
was based. The theoretical difference of "original ingredient" exists,
but in terms of the significance and number of federal questions that
might be raised, this difference may well be of no practical importance. This may be slightly less true under the second interpretation of the Mishkin theory, 86 but even under that interpretation it
seems probable that a substantial number of federal questions
will arise. Thus, the expansion of "arising under" to at least the
interstitial interpretation of Mishkin's theory would seem to be
justified as a practical matter. And the Court may be more willing to
permit this expansion if significant federal interests are in strong
need of protection. On the other hand, considerations such as the
traditional judicial reluctance to expand federal jurisdiction and
notions of federalism and comity might well lead the Court to reject
the Mishkin theory entirely. At the very least, these are some of the
more crucial factors that must be resolved in deciding the constitutionality of protective jurisdiction, and in view of the scarcity of
authoritative judicial guidance, further speculation concerning what
decision the Court might make on this issue does not seem valuable.
The first consumer class-action act proposed by Senator Tydings,
S. 198t,,87 would fall within the bounds of protective jurisdiction
83. Id.
84. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184, envisions that this protection could be attained
by exploiting the institutional differences between the federal and state courts. As an
example, he cites the possibility that federal judges might view the facts of a case more
sympathetically than might state judges. Since the outcome of a particular case might
well be different according to the forum in which it is heard, the purpose of protective
jurisdiction in Mishkin's scheme is at odds with the policy expressed by the Supreme
Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), of eliminating differences in
the application of the governing state substantive law. Mishkin notes the existence of
this policy (Mishkin, supra note 11, at 185), but fails to address himself to the inconsistency of his thesis with it.
85. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
86. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
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as defined by several of the above theories. Under the broadest approach,88 it could be maintained that Congress, by virtue of its commerce powers, could enact substantive laws dealing with the rights of
consumers in or affecting interstate commerce. Having concluded
that consumer protection laws are within a potential area of legislative regulation, it could then be argued that this is a sufficient interest
to be protected by the assertion of federal-court jurisdiction.89 However, as previously suggested,00 the constitutionality of this approach
to protective jurisdiction is suspect.
The language of S. 1980 seems to obviate the need for an analysis
of whether there might be cases involving consumer protection that
would not be amenable to the exercise of congressional lawmaking
powers.01 If there are specific cases and issues in an area over which
Congress does not have legislative sway, one could retreat to Professor
'\Vechsler's latest thesis that protective jurisdiction should obtain
despite the absence of congressional power to enact substantive law
for those cases and issues. 92 However, this rationale, already subject
to some question,93 loses much of its force when applied to S. 1980.
Professor Wechsler was able to rely on the specter of discrimination
against the residents of the District of Columbia in other state courts
as the prime example to sustain his position. The Tydings bill, in
contrast, can be intended only to protect consumers from their own
state judicial systems.94
Surely the most obvious theory on which to frame a protective88. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
89. See Letter to the Hon. Robert C. Eckhardt from Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr.,
April 30, 1969, reprinted in Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23 (1970). Professor Black wrote
that "[t]he resulting class actions, if your bill is passed, would in the most direct and
literal sense 'arise under' a law of the United States-namely, your Act, itself passed as
a measure 'necessary and proper' to the exercise of Congress's power over interstate
commerce." Id. at 22. While Professor Blad, ad;nowledged that an active federal policy
already existed in the area of con~unw,· prokllion. his language suggests that he is
endorsing protective jurisdiction in this case primarily because it is "necessary and
proper" to an article I power. In this regard, he is approaching very nearly the
argument made by Justice Jackson in the Tidewater case. See text accompanying note
20 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
91. The bill read in part: " .•. (2) Congress finds further that patterns or practices
which violate Federal and State consumer protection laws affect commerce and that
interstate commerce will be fostered by providing an effective remedy for violations
of those laws." S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(2) (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG.
REC. 10,460 (1969). This language indicates that the Congress views the entire area of
consumer protection as one in which Congress can provide substantive law because
of the impact of consumer frauds on interstate commerce.
92. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
94. See 115 CONG. R.Ec. 10,459-60 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
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jurisdiction argument in favor of S. 1980 is that of Professor Mishkin.95 Senator Tydings took pains to emphasize that consumer protection is an area of congressional regulation that is based on a "well
established Federal policy." 96 There have been numerous federal
legislative enactments in the field of consumer protection,07 thus
satisfying the prerequisites for protective jurisdiction under the
Mishkin thesis.
The more telling question then arises concerning the role of the
legislative program in the protective-jurisdiction scheme. If one assumes that protective jurisdiction over legislative programs is valid
only because of the possible interstices of the federal programs in the
state law suit, the Tydings bill is a less likely candidate for protective
jurisdiction than the Taft-Hartley Act; but it is a candidate nonetheless. Prior to Lincoln M ills 98 many issues of federal labor law could
have arisen in a state law suit brought for violation of a contract
between an employer and a labor organization. 99 There would seem
to be fewer issues of federal consumer law that might arise in a suit
brought under state consumer laws. One such issue is that of the preemptive effect of federal consumer legislation upon state consumer
laws. 100 Similarly, the circumstances in which a particular suit arises
may require a court to resolve a question concerning the consistency
of state law with federal law. Section 111 (a) of the Truth in Lending
Act101 expressly leaves in force state laws relating to the disclosure of
information in connection with credit transactions except to the
extent that those state laws are inconsistent with the federal regulations. A court might well be obliged to construe the Truth in Lending Act and decide whether the applicable state law is consistent with
the Act as so construed.
In addition to the newer genre of federal consumer protection
laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act102 and the Fair Packaging and
95. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
96. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
97. See, e.g., the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (Supp. V, 1965-1969),
and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
98. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
99. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
100. See Atlantic Ocean Prods., Inc. v. Leth, 292 F. Supp. 615 (D. Ore. 1968).
Atlantic Ocean Products sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Oregon statute that
limited the use of the word "halibut" in the sale of certain fish. The plaintiff argued
that the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969),
had pre-empted this area of regulation. The court ruled that the Act superseded only
state regulations dealing with the net contents of a package, and added that the state
statute did not conflict with any decision of the Food and Drug Administration
pertaining to the classification of halibut. 292 F. Supp. at 618.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
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Labeling Act,103 older federal legislation exists that is also designed
to safeguard the interests of consumers. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act104 and the Federal Trade Commission Act105 establish
federal regulation of significant portions of the consumer market,
although neither act expressly provides the consumer with a federal
cause of action for violations of the act. Section 303 of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act authorizes criminal sanctions for any person who
adulterates or misbrands the specified items in interstate commerce,106
but the provisions of this Act might become involved in a state cause
of action, particularly if the latter proceeds upon a theory of negligence per se. 107 The Federal Trade Commission Act gives the Commission the power to order the cessation of "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce."108 The breadth of "unfair or deceptive practices" as interpreted by the Commission and the federal
courts suggests that the involvement of federal decisional law in a
state law cause of action is not unlikely. 100 Indeed, the importance and
involvement of federal law in this area can only be enhanced, for
the second Tydings bill, S. 3092, also provides consumers with a class
action to vindicate violations of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 110 It is thus likely that federal law would become implicated in
state consumer actions. The original Tydings bill, therefore, appears
to satisfy the interstitial requirements of the Mishkin protectivejurisdiction theory.
If it is concluded that S. 1980 meets the interstitial test, it follows
a fortiori that the bill meets the broader test that there be a legislative
program to be protected in its broad contours. In this regard, it is
difficult to distinguish the field of consumer protection today from
that of labor-management relations at the time of the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act. 111 If section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act can
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
104. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-92 (1964).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
106. 21 u.s.c. § 333 (1964).
107. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960), in which
the court allowed a civil remedy on a negligence per se theory for a violation of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See also Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, 109 Mont. 213, 95
P.2d 443 (1939), in which compliance with the federal statute was raised as a defense
to a damage action.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
109. See Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1970) (statement of FTC Chairman
Paul Rand Dixon).
110. S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 32,142
(1969).
111. See Forrester, supra note 71.
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arguably be subsumed under the Mishkin thesis,11 2 it is difficult to see
why S. 1980 should not likewise be regarded as an appropriate grant
to the federal courts of the right to exercise protective jurisdiction.
The objection that can be raised to protective jurisdiction under
S. 1980, however, is that the ultimate intent of the bill was to bypass,
and perhaps indirectly to force the reform of, state procedures for
class actions. It may be questioned whether this is an appropriate
function for protective jurisdiction. Assuming the constitutional
validity of the Mishkin thesis of jurisdiction to protect legislative
programs, critics of protective jurisdiction might still maintain that
"it is going beyond the fair purport of the Constitution to permit the
federal judicial system to be used as a means of indirect reform and
modification of the rules of procedure of the states." 113 As applied to
S. 1980, this criticism may in part be unjustified since it is not clear
that the purpose of the bill was to force the states to reform their
procedures for class actions, although this might well be the denouement. What is clear, however, is that the bill was intended as a means
to bypass restrictive state class-action procedures.114 Protective jurisdiction would function under S. 1980 not to protect legislative programs from less sympathetic hearings before state courts; 115 rather, it
would serve to protect state consumers from the procedural rules of
their own state courts. Such an extension stretches the concept of
protective jurisdiction beyond that which Professor Mishkin himself
may have envisioned.
Whether Mishkin actually did envision that his theory could
validly be put to such a use is not clear. Admittedly, he was concerned more with the sympathetic application of state law than with
the failings of state procedure, 116 but he probably was not unaware of
the fact that many of the proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act viewed
section 301 as a necessity because restrictive state procedural rules
made the state courts inadequate forums for the enforcement of labor
contracts. 117 Thus, it is at least arguable that Mishkin's analysis of
the Taft-Hartley Act in terms of his thesis118 may in fact have been
an implicit endorsement of the use of federal jurisdiction to protect
litigants from cumbersome state procedure.
Conceptually, this extension is not wholly unjustified, for state
procedural rules could as easily thwart a suit that is supported by a
strong federal policy as could an unsympathetic hearing before a
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195-96.
Forrester, supra note 71, at 120.
See 115 CONG. REC, 10,459-60 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
See text accompanying note 81 supra.
See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184-85, 195-96.
Forrester, supra note 71, at 117-18.
See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195-96.
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state court. If providing the most favorable forum is a legitimate
function of protective jurisdiction, providing the most favorable
rules of procedure would appear to be an equally legitimate function.
Both functions may be necessary to vindicate the federal policy in the
case. Moreover, providing favorable rules of procedure does not seem
to be a greater impingement on the state in most cases than providing
a sympathetic forum. Since the litigation would be shifted to the
federal courts, the state interests in cost of judicial administration and
in orderly procedure-two of the most common goals of state procedural rules-would not be adversely affected. And if the state rule
is merely the product of the state's failure to revise its procedure
adequately, the rule should certainly not be sufficient to stand in the
way of federal protective jurisdiction. Moreover, even if the state
procedural rule reflects a substantive state policy, the exercise of
federal protective jurisdiction should still prevail under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.119 Thus, if the Mishkin theory of
protective jurisdiction is constitutional, its application to S. 1980
would appear to be justified, as would the further conclusion that
S. 1980 would have been constitutionally valid.
The problems of interpretation and perhaps of constitutionality
presented by S. 1980 have been rendered less obvious by Senator Tydings' introduction of S. 3092.120 Although S. 3092 is, on its face, a
bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, the bill also contains the provisions of the earlier Tydings bill (S. 1980), although in
a slightly varied form. 121 The new bill attempts to confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts by treating state law as federal law through the
techniques of adoption and incorporation. 122 As already noted,1 23 the
objective of the new bill is the same as that of S. 1980: to confer
federal jurisdiction so that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 will
be available to consumer-plaintiffs. It may be questioned why Senator Tydings chose a new approach-incorporation and adoption-in
S. 3092 to achieve the same objective he sought to achieve in S. 1980
through protective jurisdiction.
One suspects that the supporters of this legislation changed the
theory on which the legislation was based because they feared that
the bill as first introduced (S. 1980) would not fall within constitutional bounds. 124 To be sure, the Mishkin thesis, particularly when
construed in terms of an interstitial formula, is a constitutionally
persuasive one; and the original Tydings bill would apparently fall
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 7, and note 13 supra.
See note 13 supra.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
See text acompanying note 15 supra.
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within that formula despite the fact that the intent of the bill was to
avoid state procedural rules. 125 But it is not certain that the concept
of protective jurisdiction itself would be upheld by the Supreme
Court, and at least one well-known commentator is of the opinion
that the Court would reject the notion as violative of article III
limitations.126 The question that arises, then, is whether the adoption
technique can be validly used to accomplish the same end as S. 1980
would have achieved and at the same time avoid the constitutional
constraints that would have been imposed on that bill.
Traditionally, adoption and incorporation have not been used
to confer federal jurisdiction (and its attendant procedural benefits)
as an end in itself. Rather, these techniques have been employed to
achieve broader goals. Perhaps the most notable use of adoption can
be found in the series of federal assimilative crimes acts. 127 In passing
on one of the earlier assimilative acts, the Supreme Court read as
congressional intent a "design that the places under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall not be freed from the restraints
of the law .... " 128 Congress adopted state law so that some law would
in fact govern the federal enclave. This goal differs markedly from
the adoption of state law in order to vest federal-court jurisdiction in
areas in which state law is already being applied.
Adoption and incorporation have also been utilized to supplement state laws with federal law. In Griswold v. President of the
United States, 129 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the Connally Hot Oil Act.130 This Act made
it a federal crime to ship oil in interstate commerce in excess of
amounts permitted by state law. It can be argued that the adoption
technique in S. 3092 is being similarly employed to aid and supplement state consumer laws already in existence. However, the use of
adoption in the Connally Hot Oil Act and Griswold is distinguishable
from its use in S. 3092 because in the former case adoption was necessary to assist the states in remedying an abuse that they were otherwise
at a serious disadvantage in stopping.131 Federal adoption is peculiarly
appropriate in such circumstances. The same is not true, however, in
the case in which adoption is used to avoid stringent state procedural
rules that the states are capable of amending if they so desire.
Moreover, both the assimilative crimes acts and the Connally Hot
· 125. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
126. C. WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 20, at 67.
127. The present Federal Assimilative Crimes Act is codified in 18 U.S.C. § l!l (1964).
128. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278 (1909).
129. 82 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1936).
130, Act of Feb. 22, 1935, ch. 18, 49 Stat. !10, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-15l (1964),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
131. 82 F.2d at 925.
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Oil Act are clearly distinguishable from S. 3092 in one overriding
particular. The assimilative crimes acts and the Hot Oil Act were
both based on a valid legislative purpose that went beyond merely
confining jurisdiction in federal courts. The purpose of the former
was to create laws in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction,132 and
the purpose of the latter was to bring federal law enforcement
facilities to bear on the proscribed activity. 133 The sole purpose behind the adoption in S.3092, however, appears to be the granting of
federal jurisdiction. When this is so clearly the case, it would seem
that article III limitations should be operative because the granting
of federal jurisdiction is expressly limited by that article alone.
Although adoption may be justified as an exercise of Congress' article
I powers, the Supreme Court has rejected article I as a basis for expanding federal-court jurisdiction.134 Since the purpose of the adoption in S. 3092 is solely jurisdictional, article III considerations should
be determinative. Thus, the same arguments for and against the constitutional validity of S. 1980 should apply to S. 3092.
The use of adoption and incorporation of state law solely as a
means of providing federal-court jurisdiction should not be countenanced unless the result is one that can be reached within the
bounds of a constitutionally valid theory of protective jurisdiction.
As indicated earlier,135 S. 1980 would probably have fallen within the
most persuasive of the protective-jurisdiction theories-the Mishkin
theory. Yet even that theory is subject to serious and as yet totally
unresolved constitutional questions. 136 And in answering those questions, the Supreme Court would be compelled to undergo an analysis
of the appropriate limits on federal jurisdiction under article III of
the Constitution. Since the sole purpose of S. 3092 is jurisdictional,
that same analysis should be required in determining its constitutionality.
132. See United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1909).
133. Griswold v. President of the United States, 82 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1936).
134. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
136. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.

